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I. Introduction 
 
The relation between firm and information needs to be clarified for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. On the practical side, many questions have been raised regarding the impact of ICT 
(Information and Communication Technology) on economic growth. Gradually the focus of interest 
has moved from nation level to firm level. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000), and 
Jorgenson (2001) generally confirm that ICT contributed around 1/3 of the economic growth in the 
U.S., through capital-deepening effect and TFP acceleration. Industrial level studies by Stiroh (2002), 
van Ark et al. (2002), Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) show that the service industries benefited most 
from investment in ICT, and that other OECD countries lagged behind the U.S. in exploiting the 
advantages brought by ICT. An EU commission report by Barrios and Burgelman (2007) indicates a 
“first-mover advantage” of the U.S. in applying ICT. This is not surprising since Apte and Nath (2004) 
reported that by 1997, 63% of the U.S. GNP is consisted of “information economy”, which is 
information-related economic activities; and the service industries generally saw a growth in 
information-related activities.  
Furthermore, Bryjolfsson and Hitt (2000) provide firm-level evidence that ICT contributes to firm 
productivity and that organizational investment as a complementary investment to ICT investment is 
important. Matteucci et al. (2005) find firm level evidence that, in the second half of 1990s, 
European OECD countries benefited from their ICT investment, with manufacturing sector benefited 
more than service sector, yet generally are lagged behind as compared to the U.S. performance.  
Accordingly, we ask what do firms do with information, and how information technology affects 
firms’ performance. 
On the theoretical side, information economics has shown us that information plays essential role in 
explaining issues in contract design at individual level and firm level (Macho-Stadler et al. 2001), 
such as insurance policy, signaling, screening, share-cropping, and corporate governance. Beyond 
that, information is also important in explaining equilibriums of the overall economy, for example, 
the role of information in wage policy (labor market equilibrium), in equity market (allocation of 
financial resources), in diversification of prices, and in money market stability (Stiglitz, 2002).  
Moreover, other economic theories of information have been developed over time. Marschak (1954) 
and Arrow (1971, 1985) discuss the economic value of information. The Arrow (1971, 1985) papers 
manage to link economic value of information to the Shannon measure of information. Weitzman 
(1974) discuss the efficiency of two different institutions when uncertainty exists in a system, which 
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assumes imperfect information. Radner and Stiglitz (1984) show that there is nonconcavity in the 
value of information: Having little information is worse than having no information at all. 
Given the importance of information in economic analysis, it also enters the theories of firm. 
Marschak (1954) introduces firm’s structure with corresponding information processing procedure 
to analyze the value of information. Aoki (1986) distinguishes two alternative organizational 
structures of a firm: horizontal vs. vertical. And he found the conditions under which one is more 
efficient than the other when production uncertainty is embedded in the system. With organization 
costs under different firm structures considered, Carter (1995) discusses the effectiveness of seven 
different firm structures in processing information to reduce uncertainty, and thus to improve firm 
performance. Arrow (1975) points out that in an industry with upstream firms and downstream 
firms, downstream firms tend to vertically integrate to acquire input information to reduce 
uncertainty in input supply. And the industrial market tends to evolve from being competitive to 
imperfect competition as vertical integration provides market power. DeCanio and Watkins (1998) 
interpret and model the firm as an information processing network. Within this framework, the 
effect of different organizational structure on efficiency of the firm is discussed. Marschak (2004) 
provided a discussion on how IT investment, which is supposed to lower down information gathering 
cost, help a firm shift to a decentralized organizational form.  
The above mentioned literature implies to us that there must be some connection among 
information processing, organizational structure, ICT investment, and firm performance. Yet the 
picture is not really clear or comprehensive.  
While efforts have been made to provide explanations linking information processing, organizational 
structure, ICT investment and firm’s performance in one way or another, no comprehensive model 
has yet been developed to link them together. Therefore, in an attempt to accomplish this specifc 
aim, we see the firm as an information processing unit, which emerges endogenously from industrial 
markets with demand uncertainties. Information processing ability, which varies from firm to firm, is 
seen as the only thing that distinguishes firm production from non-firm production. ICT investment, 
in this model, is assumed to reduce the cost of information processing. We show that the unique 
informational advantage brings firm a surplus which is reasonably argued as information rent, 
conditional on a few key parameters, including the level of uncertainty, the degree of market 
competition, and the cost of information processing1. 
                                                          
1 If one carries this point of view further, with matured financial market, the return to any productive factor, 
say labor skill, management, capital goods, can be capitalized in its market price. Thus any productive factor is 
readily available from market. Yet after compensating all factors employed, modern firms still stand to acquire 
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We also apply the framework of our theory to the data of the wholesale and retail industry and the 
financial intermediation industry from 10 OECD countries. We investigate the mechanism and the 
extent that the aggregate firm performance – measured as multi-factor productivity – of the 
industry is decided by ICT investment, intensity of market competition, as well as average firm size. It 
is found that the two industries actually have different market structures, from which we infer 
different patterns of impact from the above factors. Interestingly, we do not observe any “first-
mover advantage”. Our results suggest that industries in different countries could choose their 
specific optimal level of ICT investment according to their own market structure – not necessarily the 
higher the better. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the very theoretical backgrounds 
which lay out the building blocks of our model. Section 3 gives detailed descriptions of the model. 
Section 4 discusses the main findings of the model. Section 5 discusses the implications derived from 
the model. Section 6 is devoted to case studies into the financial industry and the retail industry. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
II. Theoretical Issues 
 
This section lays out the building blocks of the model. First piece is about endogenous firm and 
information.  
Malmgren (1961) was among the first to ask why multi-person, multi-process firms exist in a 
competitive economy. In his view, a firm functions as an allocating mechanism of inputs and outputs.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
economic surplus – expected sustainable profit. In this sense, all unique advantages that a firm holds to 
generate this profit, be it technological or organizational, can be replicated by obtaining equivalent inputs such 
as manpower, human capital, or licenses from competitive markets of factors. The only thing that hinders one 
firm from replicating another is its information processing ability, namely the ability to acquire the best inputs 
and to process the information of the inputs in order to put them into the right positions. 
Additionally, as information processing is a costly activity, efforts devoted to reduce such cost which include IT 
investment and its complementary organizational investment are supposed to positively affect performance of 
the firm. 
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The reason why such allocation is not done by markets, which is supposed to be efficient within 
traditional settings, is because of the uncertainty and incomplete information2 that embed in real 
economy. Even if we talk about expectational equilibrium3, static general equilibrium in this case is 
difficult to be reached, due to the formidable amount of information to coordinate individual 
producers. Therefore, firstly firms arise to reduce the information requirement by integrating 
production procedures, vertically and horizontally, making the convergence of expectations possible. 
Secondly, firms arise to process internal and external information, which in return gives firms higher 
expected profit. 
Malmgren (1961) also discussed the two types of information processed by a firm: internal 
information regarding the production-related variables; and external information regarding the 
environment4 – the intermediate input market and the product market. Casson (1997) further 
developed the idea as that firms’ internal structure would routinize the processing of external 
information to be the processing of internal information, leaving the remaining external information 
to the entrepreneurs. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the routine information processing 
conducted by established firm structure.  
The second piece is about convex production technology. Yang and Ng (1995) provided a general 
equilibrium framework in which firms are endogenously derived out of economic incentive. For their 
purpose, convex production technology was assumed with multi-stage production. Their argument 
was that firms substitute market in coordinating production procedure where transaction cost is too 
high. It is worth of pointing out that they assumed an environment with certainty, and the issues of 
information and coordination are not included. 
The third piece is about demand uncertainty and availability. Carlton (1978) introduced a simple 
one-product economy with both demand and supply uncertainties. The existence of firms is given 
exogenously. The product is featured in the market by both its price and availability (possibility of 
obtaining the product from a supplier given a certain price). In this economy, it is possible that each 
firm makes a different decision on its production and pricing. It is shown that, however, with each 
party trying to maximize its expected profit or utility, given identical production technology and 
                                                          
2 Incomplete information here refers to not knowing what everyone else knows (Malmgren, 1961). This is 
distinguished from the concept of imperfect information, which means not knowing what everyone else has 
done. 
3 Individual agents in the economy can still maximize their expected utility or profit. Arrow (1964) and Debreu 
(1959) have shown that when agents are coordinated by a Walrasian auctioneer, market is cleared with a 
certain set of prices. In this way, equilibrium can be achieved. However, in Malmgren’s case, by assuming away 
the Walrasian auctioneer, the economy cannot automatically find and converge to an expectational 
equilibrium. 
4 Malmgren (1961) refers to external information as dependent on the so-called “structure of market”. 
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utility function, the economy converges to one combination of price and availability. When demand 
uncertainty decreases, the economy moves closer to equilibrium under certainty, which means a 
uniform price equal to marginal cost and one hundred percent availability. Carlton and Dana (2008) 
further extended the framework to multi-industries with quality issue considered. 
The forth piece is about intermediate input and vertical integration. As an extension of Carlton 
(1978), Carlton (1979) took the existence of firms as given, and assumed that initially firms distribute 
in both the upper stream and the lower stream of a multi-stage production procedure. Uncertainty 
in demand and input supply was assumed. It was shown that firms could have better performance 
by vertically integrating both the production of the lower and higher stream. Vertical integration 
could be seen as the the integrated firm acquiring information from the complementary stage of 
production.  
Based on the above mentioned blocks of knowledg, namely information economics, firm theory, and 
general equilibrium under uncertainty, a model of endogenous firms in a market under demand 
uncertainty would be developed. The firm, with it’s ability of information processing, would be 
rewarded information rent as its sustainable source of profit.  
 
III. The Model 
 
III(i). Model Settings 
 
In a specific industry, it is assumed that there are only one intermediate input M  and one final 
product X . Each individual agent engaged in the industry is endowed with L  labor time which we 
normalize it to one, and is capable of producing either of them using the following technologies: 
(1 )
a
M
a
X
m l
x m lα α−
=
= ⋅
,  
where 1a > , 0 1α< < . 
Xl  and Ml  denote the portions of  L  devoted into production of X  and M , respectively. The 
production technology does not allow two individuals to work together additively or multiplicatively 
in one production procedure, which means for each individual 1Xl ≤  , 1Ml ≤ , and 1X Ml l+ = . 
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Assume that the markets for both M  and X  exist. With the convex production technologies above, 
individuals as producers prefer specialization in producing one product only and then trade in the 
market, given identified expected profitable price and demand.  
Production in the overall industry could then be coordinated via intermediate input market for M . 
Namely, a portion of the population MR  in the industry specializes in producing M , while the other 
portion of the population XR  in the industry specializes in producing X . The latter purchases M  
from the former in order to produce X , and sell their products in the final product market for X . 
Each of them runs his own shop, with only himself employed, to sell their products. This system is 
thereafter referred to as a ‘market-organized production’ with full specialization of each individual. 
However, due to imperfect information5 with both buyers and producers, for both markets, no buyer 
knows how many others would go to the same shop as he does; and no producer knows how many 
buyers would drop by. It leads to availability problem when there are too many buyers and the shop 
runs out of stock. Therefore the availability can be taken as the probability of the event that the 
shop runs out of stock. 
Now, what the buyer knows is the price and availability (a kind of quality) that a shop offers; and 
what the producers know is that they face random demand, which in this model we assume it to be 
subject to a uniform distribution with parameter λ . The availability of the final product is decided 
by the output level of the shop6 , which is common knowledge to both the buyers and the producers. 
Thereby we have assumed complete information for buyers here, for simplicity. This imperfect 
information setting allows the possibility that individual shops ask for arbitrary price given his 
availability, because demand is given exogenously and therefore perfect competition is no longer 
the case . 
However, complete information for buyers means competition still exists among shops, regarding 
the policies of price and availability combinations. And such applies to both the intermediate input 
                                                          
5 This is due to the setting of our model that consumers decide simultaneously which shop to visit. For each 
consumer, he/she doesn’t know what the others have decided. Thus it is imperfect information, rather than 
incomplete information. 
6 This assumption was used by Carlton (1978). The availability issue is incurred by uncertain demand. When 
realized demand exceeds suppliers’ production level, which is decided according to their expectation, 
availability is no longer one hundred percent.  
For such a setting, there are two implicit assumptions. Firstly, production plan is implemented before the 
demand is realized. Secondly, each consumer enquires with any shop for only once. If the shop runs out of 
stock, the consumer won’t be able to try another shop. For simplicity of our analysis, the current paper 
modifies the second assumption into that for each unit of demand, buyer tries only one shop. 
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market and the final product market. It is shown later that there exists a unique equilibrium, in 
which prices of the products convey information on the intensity of market competition.  
As consumers, individuals consume X . With availability considered, the utility of consuming x  
units of X is: 
( ,  )X Xc A c AU f x Q x Q≡ = ⋅ .  
X
AQ  is the availability of the commodity, which is measured as the probability of obtaining X 7. The 
availability of the commodity can be taken as a kind of quality of it. 
 
III(ii). Consumer Behavior 
 
A typical consumer’s decision problem is, 
max. 
. . ( )
X
A
X
X A
U x Q
s t P Q x I
= ⋅
⋅ =
,  
where I  is the exogenous income8. 
XP  is the price of X . Intuitively, the price one pays for the X  product is a function of the 
availability (quality) that one is looking for. It is also intuitive that 0XX
A
P
Q
∂
>
∂
9. To maximize utility, 
consumers would require the combination of price and availability offered by a shop to satisfy the 
first order condition10: 
                                                          
7 And it will be illustrated in the subsection for the X -producers’ behavior. 
8 Note that this is not a closed one-industry economy. Rather, the object under study is one specific industry 
from a multi-industry economy. Consumers come to consume this industry’s product with their income each 
earned from this industry or from other industries. For this reason, income constraint is not an endogenous 
variable. And thus the utility function is specifically for the consumption of products of this specific industry.  
9 Availability can be seen as quality of the product. For this reason, the X - producer does not necessarily 
consume his own product, as he may well produce and sell high quality product, but consume low quality 
product, according to his preference. Thus what he cares about, as the m  producers do as well, is the 
monetary revenue he receives from the market. 
10 Put Lagrange function as ( ( ) )X XA X Ax Q I P Q xψ ν= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ . F.O.C. gives ( ) 0
X X
A X AQ P Qx
ψ
ν
∂
= − ⋅ =
∂
 
and '( ) 0XX AX
A
x x P Q
Q
ψ ν∂ = − ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
. Thus 
'( ) 1
( )
X
X A
X X
X A A
P Q
P Q Q
= . Treating it as a differential equation with 
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0
( )
X
X A
X A
Q
P Q
β
= .                                                                                                                                   (2.1) 
Parameter 0β  is the reverse of the shadow price of obtaining one unit of X  with certainty (not the 
one unit of demand realized with availability smaller than 1). It is decided by product market 
competition at the equilibrium, as will be seen later. 
Since 0X
X A
II
x
P Q
β⋅
= = , it can be shown that 0X
A
x
Q
∂
<
∂
, as well as that 
2
2 0( )XA
x
Q
∂
>
∂
. 
Actually, when pricing condition 0β  has been decided, maximum utility is fixed at 
*
0U I β= ⋅ .
11 
Thus we have the following diagram: 
(Place Figure 1 approximately here) 
Figure 1: Indifference curve of utility function and the budget constraint of consumer 
 
It can be observed that the indifference curve of maximum utility overlaps with the budget 
constraint curve. And the position of the ( , )xAQ x curve depends on . The optimal combination of 
x
AQ  and x  for the consumers could be any point along the 
*U  curve. 
 
III(iii). The Individual X -Producers’ Decision 
 
On the demand side, an individual X -producer faces random demand with a uniform distribution, 
which could be described by parameter 1λ . The probability density of the uniform distribution for 
the X -producer is 
1
1
1
( )kλφ λ
= , 1[0, ]k λ∈ , where k  denotes the realization of per shop random 
demand. It can be inferred that the larger the parameter 1λ , the greater the volatility in terms of 
variance in the market. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
unknown function ( )XP ⋅ , it can be written as 
ln ( ) 1XX A
X X
A A
d P Q
dQ Q
= . By integration, 
ln ( ) lnX XX A AP Q Q c= + , and ( )
X c X
X A AP Q e Q= ⋅ . Let 0
ceβ = , we get equation (2.1). 
11 Note that although this result shows that consumers choice on price and quality combination has no effect 
on utility gained, the optimization is necessary and important in the sense that it imposes constraint on 
producer’s pricing behaviour, as will be shown later. 
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On the production side, the X -producer buys Xm  units of the intermediate input. And then with 
full specialization, his output level is (1 )aXm L
α α⋅ −⋅ . With L  normalized to one, the output level of 
each X -producer simply is Xm
α . Next, the X -producer needs to decide how many units of  to 
purchase from the market by maximizing his expected revenue. 
Charging a price of iXP , the revenue function of the i th X -producer is: 
,  if 
={
,  if 
iX
iX
P k k m
m P k m
α
α α
π
≤
>
. 
To maximize his expected revenue, the i th X -producer would decide the optimal output and price 
levels according to: 
1 1
0
*
max. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s.t. ( )
X
A
X
iX A
m
M
X iX X iX M X M
m
X
P iX
iX
E P k k dk m P k dk P m Q P
I
U Q P U
P
α
α
α
λ λπ φ φ
∞ 
= + − 
  
= ≥
∫ ∫
, 
where ( )
A
M
MQ P  is the availability of intermediate input M  from the intermediate input market. 
The constraint condition is a reinterpretation of eq. (2.1), and means that the X -producer needs to 
offer a combination of price and availability that delivers a utility at least as high as the average level 
in the market.  
The constraint condition is equivalent to the consumers’ optimization condition – eq. (2.1). *U  is 
the average level of utility which a typical consumer can obtain from the market, by consuming with 
a certain combination of XP  and ( )A
X
XQ P . A seller thus has to provide a combination of price and 
availability which makes consumers at least as well off as this one.  
Given his output level, this constraint condition actually decides the price that the X -producer can 
charge: Since 
1
( ) ( )
A
X M
A X MQ F k m Q P
α
λ= < ×  is the availability ( 1 1
0
( ) ( )
Xm
XF k m k dk
α
α
λ λφ< = ∫  , the 
cumulative density function), the i th X -producer can charge a price
1
0
( ) ( )
A
M
X M
iX
F k m Q P
P
α
λ
β
< ×
= , according to eq. (2.1). 
11 
 
Given iXP  as exogenous, the X -producer is to decide the price and the quantity to purchase 
intermediate input M , as there possibly exists muliple combinations of price and availability of M  
to choose. Similar with the case of final product , the availability of  is a function of the price that 
the buyer – X -producer –  is willing to accept. 
It’s not difficult to show according to F.O.C. of the X -producer’s maximization that12 : 
1A
M
MQ Pβ= .                                                                                                                                                    (2.2) 
1β  is subject to equilibrium of the competitive market of intermediate input M . 
And the demand for  is decided by the F.O.C.: 
2 1
1
1
X M
X
iX
m P
m
P
α
α αα
λ
−
− − = .                                                                                                              (2.3) 
Accordingly, expected revenue of the   - producer is: 
1
1 1
0 10
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
X
A A
A
X
M Mm
X M M M
X X X M
m
F k m Q P Q P
E k k dk m k dk m Q P
α
α
α
λ α
λ λπ φ φβ β
∞  < ×
 = + − ⋅ 
    
∫ ∫ . 
 
III(iv). The M - Producers’ Decision 
 
Again let  denote the realized per shop random demand on M . A typical M - producer faces 
random demand which is subject to uniform distribution parameterized by 2λ , such that 
                                                          
12 iXP  is exogenous to the X -producer’s optimization problem at this moment for two reasons: on the one 
hand the producer can decide arbitrarily to charge any price he wants and it is only when the market 
converges to the equilibrium that he is bounded by the constraint condition; on the other hand the price is to 
be determined by 0β  in the equilibrium, which is an exogenous variable to individual producers. 
Thus we have 
1 1
0
( )
' ( ( ) ( ) ) 0
X
X
m
M M
A iX X M X A X
M m
E
Q P kP k dk m P k dk P m Q m
P
α
α
α
λ λ
π ∞ ∂
= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅ = 
∂   
∫ ∫ , and 
1 1
0
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) 0
X
X
m
M M M
iX X iX M A X A M A XM
A m
E
P kP k dk m P P k dk P Q m Q P Q m
Q
α
α
α
λ λ
π ∞ ∂
= + − − ⋅ ⋅ = 
∂   
∫ ∫ . 
Combining the two we have 
1
'
' MMA
P
Q
= , which gives us equation (2.2). 
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2
2
1
( )kλφ λ
=  is the probability density function, 2[0, ]k λ∈ . Parameter 2λ  describes the volatility in 
the intermediate input market, and is itself partially decided by the professional distribution of 
population: x
m
R
R
13. However, there is a precondition for the M - producer to fully specialize in the 
production of : 2 1λ ≥ . Otherwise, given that an  - producer knows that the maximum of 
demand coming to him is less than one, there is no reason to fully specialize in the production of M : 
1 1a = . 
The revenue function for the i th M - producer is, 
,  if 1
={
,  if 1
iM
iM
P k k
P k
π
≤
>
. 
The M -producer faces a decision problem of: 
2 2
1
0 1
*
max. ( ) ( ) ( )
s.t. ( | ) ( )
iM iM
X iM X
E P k k dk P k dk
E P E
λ λπ φ φ
π π
∞
= +
≥
∫ ∫
. 
The constraint condition is equivalent to the X -producers’ optimization condition – eq.(2.2). It 
means that the combination of price and availability of  offered by one  - producer in the market 
should provide the buyer – X -producers – with an expected revenue at least as high as the average 
level. Given that the  - producer’s output level is fixed at 1 (if 2 1λ ≥ ), the constraint condition 
already decides the price that can be charged for at the equilibrium: 2
1
( 1)
iM
F k
P λ
β
<
= , since 
2 2
1
0
( ) ( 1) ( )
A
M
iMQ P F k k dkλ λφ= < = ∫ . 
Accordingly, expected revenue of the M -producer is14: 
                                                          
13 Intuitively, 2λ  (as well as 1λ ) describes the largest possible demand that one shop-runner might face. It 
must be jointly decided by factors like the size of the population of buyers and purchasing power of the buyers.  
14 With uniform distribution, 2
1 2
1
1
( ) (1 )
2M
E
λπ
β λ
= ⋅ −
⋅
. Thus ( )ME π  increases as 2λ  decreases. 
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2
2 2
1
1 0 1
( 1)
( ) ( ) ( )m
F k
E k k dk k dkλ λ λπ φ φβ
∞<  
= + 
 
∫ ∫ . 
The only decision for the -producer at the equilibrium is whether he wants to stay in the industry. 
When his expected revenue deteriorates, he might wish to leave. With the exit of some M - 
producers, parameter 2λ  would adjust to push up the expected revenue of the rest of the M - 
producers. 
 
III(v). The Equilibrium of Market-Organized Production 
 
That individually specialized X  and M  producers implement the two-stage production procedure 
via market transactions of intermediate input M  is referred to as market-organized production. 
 Since we have identical consumers and producers in this economy, it is intuitive that the equilibrium 
of this economy is a certain combination of price and availability for each of the two products, to 
which all producers and buyers would converge. 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium in which the producers in either market produce at the same output 
level to offer the same availability and sell their product at the same price is stable.    
Take the X -producer as an example. Given such equilibrium has been achieved, suppose that firm  
i  disobeys the equilibrium ( , )
A
X
XP Q  and raises its price, resulting in no purchase from the 
consumers because of its higher price with the same availability as before. However, it is possible 
that he uses the higher price to pay for the higher production cost to increase availability of his 
products. To do this, note that the availability of intermediate input is virtually fixed because the M
-producer cannot increase its production anymore, so the X -producer cannot get higher availability 
of M , by paying a higher price. The only way to increase output, and thus availability, is to increase 
its purchase of M . Nevertheless this is not revenue maximizing, as the marginal product of  
would decrease, which means that the cost incurred by increasing production is to be higher than 
the possible increase in the price of X .  
Alternatively, if one deviates by quoting a price lower than xP , he loses expected profit if he 
produces at equilibrium output level. However, if he chooses to cut down his output level, the 
marginal product of M  would be higher than the price of  in the market, which implies that he 
should increase his production. 
14 
 
Thus we find that the equilibrium is stable at least in its neighbourhood. A formal proof of this point 
can be found in the appendix A. 
The other important property of the equilibrium is:  
( ) ( )X ME Eπ π= .                                                                                                                                (2.4) 
This property helps us determine the pricing parameters 0β  and 1β . Without loss of generality,  the 
price of M  is normalized as 1MP = . Then we have: 
2
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<
= = < = . 
Using eq. (2.4), we have 0β  in terms of Xm - the optimal quantity of M that X  - producers would 
like to purchase. 
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k k dk k dk m k
α
α
α α
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ
φ φ
β
φ φ φ
∞
∞
 
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+ + ⋅ <
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
Applying the above results to equation (2.3), when 
1
2
α = , Xm  can be solved in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
Thus, the output level of the X - producer is 
1
2
Xq m= , which assumes different value according to 
the specific values of 1λ  and 2λ (Figure 2)
15. 
(Place Figure 2 approximately here) 
Figure 2: Output level q  of x -producers with specific values of 1λ  and 2λ .  
 
Since 0β  can be written in terms of Xm , 0β  is also determined by 1λ  and 2λ  (Figure 3). 
                                                          
15 For certain combinations of  ( 1λ , 2λ ), Xm  turns negative, simply because specializing in producing X  is no 
longer optimal, due to volatile uncertainty in the markets. Mathematically, we could add non-negative 
constraint to the X - producer’s maximization problem, which gives us corner solutions and eliminate the 
negative part. However, doing this would not influence any of our major conclusions. 
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(Place Figure 3 approximately here) 
Figure 3: Pricing parameter 0β  with specific values of 1λ  and 2λ . 
It is not difficult to observe that both output level and pricing parameter assume values with 
economic sense within certain range of ( 1λ , 2λ ). 
 
III(vi). Firm Production 
 
Now we derive firms with features identified by Malmgren (1961): a multi-person, multi-process 
mechanism of allocating inputs and outputs. To examine our hypothesis, the firm derived in this 
model is assumed with no advantages in terms of production technology or retail channels (Figure 4).  
(Place Figure 4 approximately here) 
Figure 4: The structure of a firm 
As illustrated by Figure 4, a firm hires individuals from the labor market, making them specialize in 
the production of either  or X . The production and supply of M  is pooled together, and then 
distributed to individual X –shops of the firm. The production and supply of X  is still done at 
individual shops. We also assume that the shops are relatively independent and do not 
communicate with each other. Thus the only difference between the firm production and the 
market-organized production is that a labor market replaces the intermediate input market. By 
doing this, a firm processes the information of supply and demand of the intermediate input within 
the firm.  
At each X -shop, the expected revenue is: 
1 1
0
( ) ( )
f
f
m
X f
m
P k k dk m k dk
α
α
α
λ λφ φ
∞ 
 +
  
∫ ∫ . 
Decision problem for the firm to maximize its expected profit is, when there are i  shops: 
1 1
0
max. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ( 1))
f
f
m
f X i i i f i i f f
i m
E P k k dk m k dk w i m C i m
α
α
α
λ λπ φ φ
∞ 
 = + − × × + − ⋅ +
  
∑ ∫ ∫  
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1
*. . ( )f
X
I
s t F k m U
P
α
λ⋅ < ≥ . 
( )C ⋅  is the cost of processing the information to run such an organization, with ' 0C > , '' 0C > . For 
simplicity, assume that C  takes the functional form of 2 2( ( 1)) ( 1)f fC i m i mθ⋅ + = ⋅ ⋅ + , in which θ  
reflects the level of information processing ability. θ  mainly depends on factors like the 
entrepreneur’s ability, communication infrastructure, and organizational structure. And w  is the 
wage that firm pays to its employees. 
Intuitively, the existence of informational cost limits the number of firms that qualifies in terms of 
information processing ability. Moreover, as such cost is monotonically increasing, the size of a firm 
is limited with informational cost considered. Thus it is assumed that when the first few firms come 
into being in the industry, the market-organized production as described earlier is still dominating 
the economy. In other words, the information processing ability is scarce. This is equivalent to saying 
that the firm production at this stage, either in terms of firm’s size or in terms of number of them, 
could not affect the pricing parameter 0β  given by the equilibrium of the market-organized 
production.  
Therefore, under the firm production arrangement, availability of the product is 
1
( )XA fQ F k m
α
λ= < , since uncertainty in the supply of intermediate input is eliminated; and with 
pricing parameter 0β  from the equilibrium of market-organized production, the price that the firm 
can charge is: 
1
0
( )f
X
F k m
P
α
λ
β
<
= . 
As the expected labor income level in the industry in equilibrium is not affected by the entry of firms 
in the current scenario, the wage w  that the firm needs to offer in order to make individual agents 
indifferent between taking a job and running his individual shop is ( ) ( )X Mw E Eπ π= = . Appendix 
B provides proof. 
Rewrite the maximization problem of a firm as: 
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. 
The firm needs to decide its optimal supply of intermediate input  to each shop, as well as its 
optimal size, i.e. how many shops to run. 
According to the first order conditions (when 
1
2
α = ), 
1 1 2 2
1
0 0 1*
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( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( )
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X f f
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f
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+
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,                       (2.5) 
and 
2 2
1
2
1
( 1 1 4 )1
*
4f
m
λ
λ
− + +
= ⋅ .                                                                                                           (2.6) 
fm  is now in terms of 1λ  only (Recall that Xm  was solved in terms of both 1λ  and 2λ ). Firm size i  
is also expressed in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
(Place Figure 5 approximately here) 
Figure 5: Plotting *fm .  Horizontal axis is 1λ , and vertical axis is fm . 
(Place Figure 6 approximately here) 
Figure 6: Plotting *i , with 0.001θ =  as given. 
Total employment of the firm is * *( 1)fi m⋅ + , which can also be expressed in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
 
 
IV. Information Rent and Entrepreneurship 
 
The firm’s decisions made above deliver an expected profit: 
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= ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + .                                 (3.1) 
Inserting eq. (2.5) and (2.6) into (3.1), the expected profit can be written in terms of 1λ  and 2λ . 
Figure 7 gives the expected profit of the firm under different combinations of 1λ  and 2λ , when 
pricing parameter 0β  and parameter of informational cost θ  are given
16. 
(Place Figure 7 approximately here) 
Figure 7: Plotting ( )*fE π  when 0.001θ = . 
Given sufficiently low informational cost of the firm (in this case, 0.001θ = ), the result comes that 
the firm production conditionally makes positive expected profit. It shows the motivation of starting 
up a firm, as well as the sustainability of the firm production. 
Three points are to be made regarding the positive expected profit. Firstly, it is a surplus, since all 
visible productive factors – intermediate input and labor input – have been decently paid at market 
rates. Secondly, since the basic difference between firm production and market-organized 
production is that the firm has had the information regarding production and demand of 
intermediate input processed, the surplus can only be attributed to the information that the firm has 
obtained. Thirdly, as assumed previously, the information processing ability is unique to a firm, 
which means that parameter  is unique to a firm. This implies that the supply of such ability is 
completely inelastic.  
In order to get this information processing ability into work, with its best effort and with the true 
information, the right to claim this surplus (residual return) should be assigned to the provider of 
this ability. This argument is similar to that by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) about team production. 
Thus according to the theory of economic rent, the surplus claimed by the provider of information 
processing ability – the firm, is considered economic rent, both in the sense of Ricardian rent and in 
the sense of Paretian rent (Wessel, 1967; Lackman, 1976).  Since the source of this surplus is 
information, we call it “information rent”. 
                                                          
16 Pricing parameter 0β  is decided by 1λ  and 2λ  in the equilibrium of market-organized production. However, 
setting 0β  as irrelevant to 1λ  and 2λ  is a generalized case that the firm does not necessarily always stay in an 
environment dominated by market-organized production – intuitively 0β   increases as number of firms 
increases because of competition. Should this be the case, 0β  exogenously assumes different value. 
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This information rent to the firm has some interesting properties. 
Proposition 2:  Ceteris paribus, the firm’s information rent depends on both volatility in the 
intermediate input market and volatility in the final product market.  
It can be shown that the firm with 0.001θ =  is only profitable within a certain range of value of 
parameters 1λ  and 2λ  (Figure 7).  
Firstly, as mentioned before, non-autarchy production of the industry requires 2 1λ ≥ . This is not 
only important to firm production, but also to market-organized production, as shown in Figure 2.  
Beyond 1 1λ = , it is noted that the greater the 2λ  value, the greater the profitability. Secondly, 
similarly for a very small value of 1λ , firm production is not viable, nor is the market-organized 
production. Beyond a certain small value of 1λ , it is noted that the greater the 1λ  value, the greater 
the profitability.  
So far our conclusions are based on the argument that a few firms could emerge from the primitive 
market-organized production without affecting the pricing condition 0β  of the equilibrium of the 
market-organized production, and therefore they earn positive surplus. In the subsequent discussion, 
we allow 0β  to be exogenous and different from the 0β  determined by the equilibrium of the 
market-organized production. So that given 1λ  and 2λ , values of 0β  and θ  would decide the sign 
and scale of the information rent.  
Proposition 3: According to eq. (2.5) and (3.1), when the values of 0β  or θ  vary, their impacts on 
the information rent is doubled by not only entering *( )fE π  directly, but also entering into the 
firm’s decision on its optimal size *i .  
The following discussion justifies our relaxation of the assumption that firms survive in markets 
dominated by market-organized production. Assume that the information processing ability θ  is 
initially a natural gift which distributes randomly among the industrial population – each individual is 
gifted with a value of θ . Assuming that the industrial population is n , they are put into an ordered 
sequence as 1 2 3( ,  , , ..., )nθ θ θ θΘ = . Therefore in our system, an individual can start up a firm with 
his own gift of information processing ability and at the same time be in the labor force himself. 
Thus we introduce entrepreneurship here, as a result of the natural gift of information processing 
ability. 
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In the equilibrium of the market-organized production, 0β was decided in the way so that 
( ) ( )X ME Eπ π=  holds. Newly emerged firms would take advantage of this equilibrium to make 
positive information rent. 0β  determined as such is the benchmark pricing condition in the market.  
With the number of firms growing, market share for the market-organized production shrinks, which 
means that the volatility of the markets for the producers under market-organized production shrink. 
When this continues, eventually at a certain point no positive product would be produced by the X
-producers who run individually. Market-organized production then no longer provides benchmark 
0β  for the industry. At this moment, 0β and wage level w  are both subject to change according to 
competition among firms in the product market as well as in the labor market. The mechanism of 
competition in the product market works as follow: If a firm chooses to offer a higher 0β , it gets all 
its stock sold with certainty, as all consumers would prefer purchasing its product first. Only when 
this firm’s stock of product gets exhausted, the consumers would turn to other producers. Therefore, 
price competition begins.  
With w  exogenously determined by the labor market condition, the intensity of the competition in 
the product market will determine the value of 0β . It can be shown that when perfect competition 
applies with a large number of firms existing, all firms earn zero profit in our model setting; while if 
there exists market power to a small number of surviving firms, all firms could have positive profit, 
and the size of profit depends on their respective information processing ability. That how many 
firms could exist depends on the information processing ability θ , as well as the threshold set up by 
the exogenous 0β  and w . (Detailed illustration can be found in Appendix C) Therefore the model 
extends to more realistic industrial markets. 
 
 
V. Implications 
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The current model does not close as if in a general equilibrium setting, which would set the income 
of consumers of product X  as endogenously determined by pricing parameter 0β
17. Rather, we 
consider it as an equilibrium analysis for a certain industry existing in a broader economy, where 
there are other industries in the economy. Consumers of product X  come from all industries 
including the current one, with a certain portion of their total income. Then the idea that consumers 
have exogenously determined budget constraint becomes sensible.  
However, it does require certain imagination to accept that, the pre-determined population engaged 
in this certain industry reflects equilibrium of the overall economy which is beyond the analysis of 
this model, so that the demand and supply of X  could be balanced. As with the problem of optimal 
division of labor inside the industry, the current model deals with it, with demand uncertainty 
considered.  
Recall the essential assumptions we have made in the model: 
1. There is convex production technology openly available for all producers, which provides 
incentive for specialization. 
2. There is imperfect but complete information for both buyers and sellers. Buyers randomly 
visit sellers’ shops. As a result, sellers find themselves facing demand uncertainty, which is 
subject to uniform distribution. For the same reason, the availability of the product from one 
shop is smaller than one hundred percent, in terms of probability. This applies to both 
intermediate input and final product markets. 
3. A firm is featured as an organization with multi-person and multi-stage production. It 
employs labor from the labor market, and uses the same production technology to produce 
both intermediate input and final product. It sells its final product at individual shops. The 
shops are independent from each other. 
4. The only difference between firm production and market-organized production is that, a 
firm has the production process organized by processing the information of demand and 
supply of the intermediate input. In the latter, no one knows more than anyone else. 
5. Information processing is a costly process. 
With these settings, any superior performance of a firm must be attributed to its informational 
advantage, and the following implications are derived from such a model: 
                                                          
17 Pricing parameter 1β , which works for the intermediate input market, is virtually given by normalizing MP  
to be one, and by assuming m -producers would fully specialize. Thus we have 21
( 1)
1
F kλβ
<
= . 
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1. Under certain conditions, firm production generates a positive surplus, after all factors and 
costs been well-paid.  The advantage neither the result of better technology nor better 
organizational form, but unique information processing ability. For this reason, the surplus is 
called information rent. 
2. A firm’s performance depends on a set of parameters, among which 	 and 
 describe the 
degree of demand uncertainty in the two markets,  is the pricing parameter given by the 
competitive market, and  describes the informational cost. 
3. The competitive market environment, described by 0β , affects the size of information rent 
in a few ways. One is that it determines the expected income level of individual producers as
( ) ( )X ME Eπ π= , which is equivalent to labor cost w  of the firm when the market-
organized production dominates. Additionally, as indicated by proposition 3, it has direct 
impact on the size of the information rent, and indirect impact on it via the optimal firm size. 
4. For a firm, pricing parameter 0β  deteriorates in two ways. When the market is dominated 
by market-organized production, overly volatile demand uncertainties in the two markets 
lead to too small a 0β , which drives out the information rent. When the market is 
dominated by firm production, with the number of capable competing firms increasing, 0β  
turns larger18. This also eventually drives information rent to become close to zero. The 
latter case might be due to spill-over of information processing ability, as people gradually 
learn to mimic entrepreneur’s practice. This could be called the dissipation of rent. 
Now we are ready to examine whether information rent exists as a sustainable source of firm profit 
in the real economy. We are interested in the service industries which are close to our assumptions 
in many ways.  Specifically, we take the wholesale & retail industry and the financial intermediation 
industry as our subjects of case study. 
Firstly, production technology of these industries is plain and open to anyone. No one could claim a 
patent on the design or organization of a store, nor could anyone claim patent on an investment tool 
tailored for customers. In fact, there exist many individually run retail shops, as well as many self-
employed financial agents, both of them serve in certain businesses the same way big companies do. 
Secondly, demand in the markets do appear random to certain extent. Thirdly, both the labor and 
the final product market are relatively competitive in the two industries, which means that market 
power can hardly be the source of sustainable profit. However, neither of them is perfectly 
                                                          
18 There could be less volatility in the intermediate input market, which means a smaller 2λ . According to 
Figure 3, this would deliver a larger 0β . 
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competitive with homogeneity embedded. We do observe that with the same commodity sold in the 
shops, or with the same banking service from the financial institutions, different prices are charged. 
Thus the reality is close to our assumption in model. Fourthly, according to empirical studies (van Ark, 
2002), these two industries do benefit substantially from ICT advancement and investment in the 
U.S., which is a result that could be predicted by our model. For these reasons, we use the two 
industries as our subjects. 
 
 
6. Case studies 
 
In this section, a cross-country industry-level panel data analysis is conducted to examine our 
theoretical predictions. The wholesale and retail industry and the financial intermediation industry 
are the subjects of this empirical analysis. Our sample includes data of the two industries from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Italy, Australia, South Korea, Denmark, Finland, 
and Austria, covering the period from 1980 to 2005. Data is collected respectively from the EU-
KLEMS database, the OECD.stats database, and statistics bureaus of the respective countries. 
Combining the theoretical frameworks of growth accounting approach in the literature and our 
model, the following econometric model is established.  
1( , )i i i i i i i iY A F K N A K N
ρ ρ−= × = × × . 
where iY  is the  real output of industry i , K  is capital stock, N  is employment, and A  is multi-
factor productivity. 
With iP  denoting the price of the product,  
1
i i i i i iP Y P A K N
ρ ρ−× = × × ×  
is the nominal output. 
It follows that (1 )
i i i i i iP Y P A K N
g g g g gρ ρ× = + + + −  
We want to look at the growth of nominal value-added per labor hour rather than real value-added 
per labor hour for two reasons: Firstly, it is technically difficult to distinguish how much the growth 
of value in current price of a service is due to quality improvement and how much of that is due to 
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inflation19. A measure of real value-added could thus be a biased measure. Secondly, the purpose of 
the study is the firms’ ability to generate profit (rather than the ability to produce), which is not a 
homogeneous function of prices of degree one.  
Thus we have: 
(1 )
i i i i i i i iP Y H P A K N H
g g g g g g gρ ρ× − = + + ⋅ + − ⋅ −  
where 
iH
g  is the growth rate of labor hour. 
The growth rate of the nominal value-added per labor hour, iglph , can be decomposed as follows, 
(1 )
i ii A k i
glph INF g g glqα ρ ρ= ⋅ + + ⋅ + − ⋅
                                                                                         (5.1) 
where ik  is the capital per labor hour, and iglq  is the measure of growth of labor quality as defined 
by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). iA
g
 is the growth rate of industrial multi-factor productivity, which 
is the key variable that we use to measure the aggregate firm  performance in the industry. INF is 
the general inflation rate of the economy, which is used to proxy for iP
g
 with iP
g INFα= ⋅
. This 
treatment is necessary since it is difficult to accurately estimate the price for a single unit of service, 
and the overall inflation data is readily available. 
Since the subjects under study are service industries, the iA
g
term, which is the aggregate firm 
performance of the industry, hardly contains technological improvement in the production of the 
service provided by the industry. Additionally, technological improvement in capital goods is 
counted for in the growth of capital stock per capita, and labor skill improvement is counted for in 
the iglq  term. Therefore, according to our model, the iAg  term should only be explained by cost of 
information (described by parameterθ ), market competition (described by parameter 0β ), and size 
of firms.  
To examine this hypothesis, we further run the regression of 
iA
g  over the following explanatory 
variables, as implied by our theoretical model: (i). Growth of ICT capital stock of the industry, 
measured as 
iIT
g , to control for cost of information; (ii). Growth of level of labor compensation in 
the very industry, measured as 
iILCPH
g , which is a proxy for market competition, since 0β  is a key 
                                                          
19 Interested readers can refer to SNA93 for detailed information. 
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determinant of labor compensation in our model; (iii). Average firm size of the industry, measured as 
iFZ . 
The regressions are designed to find evidence that θ , 0β , and firm size impact economic 
performance of firms in the way that our model predicts; it also examines whether the expected 
profit which is sustainably generated from information processing ability of firms, is the reason that 
the U.S. industries have had outstanding performances. 
Therefore, after iA
g
 is estimated from equation (5.1), we have, 
1 2 3( )i i iA IT ILCPH i ij ig g g FZ uβ β β ε= + + + + ,                                                                                         (5.2) 
where ij
u
is fixed country effect of country 
j
, and iILCPH
g
 is the growth rate of industrial per hour 
labor compensation.    
As TFP (or Multi-factor productivity) data for each industry in each country is readily available from 
the EU-KLEMS database which use growth accounting method, we also run regressions (5.3) against 
this data to check if the results from the above are reliable, as a robustness test. 
(5.3) 1 2 3( )i i itfp IT ILCPH i ij ig g g FZ uβ β β ε= + + + +  
 
Case I: The wholesale and retail industry 
Figure 8 gives the mean and standard deviation of some key variables relevant to firm performance, 
according to our theoretical model. It can be observed that industries in different economies follow 
different patterns of growth, probably due to that they are running at different stages of 
development. The U.S. wholesale and retail industry relies more on growth of ICT capital stock: a 
relatively stable and high growth in ICT drives median level of growth of nominal labor productivity. 
The industry of Japan relies more on significant labor quality improvement, while its growth of labor 
compensation is among the lowest, hinting that firm performance benefited more from slack 
domestic competition. The industry of U.K. and Korea has low ICT growth, low labor quality growth, 
while industrial labor compensation grows relatively faster, supporting firm performance to surge 
high. Combining data of average firm size in the industry, it is observed that firms in the industries of 
the two countries experienced faster expansion, which is what our theoretical model would predict. 
(Place Figure 8 approximately here) 
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While there is a variety in our individual observation, by pooling the countries together in a panel 
regression, the pattern for this wholesale and retail industry becomes clear (table 1). 
Table 1: Wholesale and retail industry regression results 
(Place Table I approximately here) 
Regression results from equation (5.2) and equation (5.3) are very similar. The results reveal two 
findings: First, ICT capital stock, which reduces the cost of information processing, has a positive 
impact on the performance of firms; Second, growth in labor compensation and firm size both have 
positive impact on the performance of firm. This implies a lower θ  has pushed the optimal firm size 
higher. Given a certain 0β  value, i.e. intensity of competition, optimal size of firms can be larger to 
improve firm performance. According to our extension of the theoretical model, the number of firms 
can also be larger because of growth in ICT stock, to improve the performance of the whole industry. 
In other words, ICT investment brings room for expansion to the industry.  
(Place Figure 9 approximately here) 
Figure 9: The effects of decreasing θ  numbered as 1, 2, and 3. 
Figure 9 illustrates the three simultaneous effects numbered as 1, 2, and 3, of the decreasing cost of 
information processing: 
 
 As more firms enter the industry, the markets turn less volatile - λ s getting smaller, pushing 0β  
higher20, which is negative to the aggregate firm performance.  

 As more firms enter the industry, labor market becomes stringent, the rising labor cost would 
squeeze information rent for each firm. Thus it’s negative as well. 
However, for the industry as a whole, before the number of firms coming to a certain level, 
aggregate firm performance could be improving as production switches from market-organized style 
to firm style. Such is because at this stage, that more firms come in with positive profit outweighs 
that each firm has less profit than before.  

 θ  has the effect of pushing up the optimal firm size. Therefore it is a positive effect. However, it 
is possible that such tightens the labor market. 
                                                          
20 See footnote 8. 
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According to this theory, the generally positive effect of ICT investment over the wholesale and retail 
industry keeps happening as long as positive effects more than compensate the negative effect, 
which means when 0β  and w  do not increase to too high. 
Thus the story of the wholesale and retail industry can be well explained by our model. 
 
Case II: The financial and insurance industry 
Figure 10 displays the different growth patterns of the finance and insurance industry of each 
economy. For example, ICT growth of the finance and insurance industry in the U.S. is among the 
highest, accompanied by low labor quality growth and median level labor compensation growth; yet 
the nominal labor productivity growth is in the median-low zone. Combining data on its firm size in 
the industry, implication is clear that increasing intensity of competition is the reason that keeps 
improvement of aggregate firm performance low, while labor compensation grows relatively high. 
The U.K. and Australia cases are different. They have relatively high IT accumulation, negative labor 
quality growth, but relatively high labor compensation growth. These features deliver them 
significant improvement in aggregate firm performance. Possible explanation is that as the cost of 
information processing is cut down by ICT investment, while competition in the industry intensifies 
with more number of firms and larger firm size, the positive effects outweighs the negative effects 
according to the second point of the analysis of Figure 9. Thus we see a double high growth in firm 
performance and labor compensation. 
(Place Figure 10 approximately) 
Table 2: Finance and insurance industry regression results 
(Place Table II approximately) 
However, the regression results for the finance and insurance industry data are ambiguous.  
Generally, the following are observed: First, when firm size is controlled, growth of IT capital stock 
has positive impact; when firm size is dropped, the impact of growth of IT capital stock turns 
significantly negative; Second, the growth of labor compensation in the industry has positive impact 
on the performance of firms; Third, period fixed effect is more suitable for this industry, rather than 
fixed country effect.  
Recall Figure 9, the story implied for the finance and insurance industry is that accelerated 
investment in IT reduces cost of information processing. According to our model, it pushes up the 
optimal firm size, thus enabling the expansion of the size of each firm. On the other hand, lower 
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information processing cost would continue to enable more entry of firms into the industry, pushing 
up industrial labor compensation, as well as the 0β value. Such would offset its effect on the optimal 
firm size. The positive sign of labor compensation term means that it is working in another way 
round, in which higher labor cost curbs firm entry, relieving information rent from the squeeze of 
labor cost. To sum up, in the case of the finance and insurance industry, in contrast to the previous 
one, firm size effect turns negative because the intensity of competition 0β  is already large enough. 
 
The fixed country effect 
Fixed country effect in our regressions displays ambiguous results. In the wholesale and retail 
industry, fixed effect for a certain country has different signs in regressions with eq. (5.2) and (5.3).  
Under eq. (5.2), the U.S. has positive fixed effect, yet it is neither unique nor the most significant one. 
Under eq. (5.3), the U.S. fixed effect is actually negative. In the finance and retail industry, the U.S. 
fixed effect is always negative, while other countries’ fixed effect being positive or negative.  
Within the framework of this study, we are examining what contribute to the growth of the residual 
term of an industrial production function, and the magnitude that these factors contribute to it. 
After all productive factors have been well paid for its service (equation 5.1)21, the residual term 
connotates the ability of the industry to generate surplus, which, according to our analysis, is 
basically due to the information processing ability of firms. Generally, no unique country effect in 
the growth of this residual term for the U.S. is found, which is not consistent with the hypothesis in 
literature that there is a first-mover advantage to the U.S. Rather, the growth of this residual term 
can be explained by ICT investment (with its capital-deepening effect filtered), intensity of market 
competition, and the size of firms. And these factors impact on the aggregate performance of firms 
in the industry, in the way that our model can predict.  
The policy implication is that a country can conduct its own optimal ICT investment strategy, 
combined with industrial organization policy to improve the performances of the service industries, 
thus leading to a higher growth path.  
 
 
                                                          
21 Our residual term estimated is trivially different from the TFP data provided by the EU-KLEMS database, 
which is estimated using growth accounting approach. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
We started with the enquiry that how the information and communication technology (ICT) 
improves firm performance, so as to improve the performance of the industry, as well as that of the 
economy, which is argued by the empirical literature.  Then a model of firm in a certain industry with 
demand uncertainty is developed.  
Initially in the model, there are only individual producers specialized at two different stage of 
production, coordinated via an intermediate input market. However, facing demand uncertainty in 
both two markets, efficiency of resource allocation is lower than a full information scenario. 
Alternatively, if we count the availability property of the products in this model as the only type of 
quality, the model means that under demand uncertainty, product quality would be lower or a 
higher price is charged for the same quality as compared to full information scenario. A firm then is 
organized to eliminate uncertainty in the intermediate input market. The realization of a firm 
organization in this model is as described by Figure 6, where a firm hires workers and divide them 
into two groups: one producing and one producing . To assume away any special technological 
advantage of a firm, it is assumed that in the final product market, the firm is still loosely organized 
as several shops ran by individual  producers. 
The firm, although without assuming special technological advantage, manages to provide final 
product with higher availability (or higher quality), charging a higher price in the market. This way 
the firm would gain an excessive surplus, which we refer to as information rent, after all production 
factors being well paid at market rate of compensation, provided that the cost of processing 
information to run this organization is low enough.  
Via the model, we understand in what ways the cost of information processing, intensity of market 
competition, as well as size of the firm affect this information rent. 
To test if these theoretical predictions apply to real economy, the paper conducted case studies on 
the wholesale and retail industry, and the finance and insurance industry. Choosing service 
industries to examine our model prediction is basically for the convenience of analysis, as the service 
industries fit our model assumptions in many ways.  
It is found that ICT investment has different patterns of impact over the two service industries. In the 
wholesale and retail industry, ICT investment brings positive impact directly; indirectly, it pushes up 
the optimal firm size and allows more firms to enter, making the aggregate effect positive to 
aggregate firm performance. In the finance and insurance industry, as intensity of competition is 
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already high, lower information cost further intensifies it by introducing more firms into the industry. 
Therefore it pushes up the value of 0β , offseting its effect on the optimal firm size.  
Lastly, we learn from the fixed country effect coefficients that it is unlikely that there is a first-mover 
advantage attached to any single economy. Rather, different economies could adjust their ICT 
investment strategies according to the development stage with corresponding market structure of 
the specific industry. This is because that ICT investment does not necessarily and automatically 
bring better industrial performance – therefore not necessarily the higher the better. It depends on 
many other factors, especially intensity of market competition, that we should consider in policy-
making. 
To put an end to this stage of study, it is noted that the current research is a partial equilibrium 
analysis, rather than a general equilibrium analysis, of one industry. Also we have assumed away 
capital investment and human capital accumulation in the model. By adding those into consideration 
could generate the dynamic pattern of performance improvement related to information processing.  
Moreover, one might find the convex production technology too strong an assumption. 
Thus future researches can be conducted in at least two ways: One is to establish general 
equilibrium analysis with multi-sector and multi-product; the other is to introduce dynamic analysis 
to see the evolution of performances of industries and the overall economy. 
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Appendix A 
 
Stability of equilibrium with market-coordinated production 
§ Equilibrium as the intersection of demand and supply curves 
To show that the equilibrium exists for the final product market, we can derive the consumer’s 
demand curve and the X -producer’s supply curve. Consumers demand is readily described by 
equation (2.1). Now we derive the producer’s supply curve. 
For the X -producer, 
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iXP
I
 is the reverse of demand from one consumer. As what the producer cares about is how much 
price to set for exactly one unit of demand, we can safely put 1iX
P
I
= . 
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Then we end up with 
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Since 
1
( ) ( )
A A
X M
MQ F k m Q P
α
λ= < ⋅ , the above equation is exactly equal to equation (2.3). 
Thus this equation describes the producer’s supply curve (consumer’s requirement on combinations 
of price and availability is ignored here so as to derive producer’s independent optimal behavior). 
To find out the intersection of the consumer’s demand curve and the producer’s supply curve, 
simply substitute iXP  with equation (2.1). 
Then we are lead back to equation (2.3).  
 
§ Existence of Global Equilibrium 
Suppose that an individual X -producer produces at ( ')m α , and m’>m*. Then he sets a price 
according to 1
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A
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= , assuming that 0β  is the reverse of a commonly 
accepted shadow price of one actual unit of demand in the x market. 
This producer’s profit is, 
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When 
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α = , we have 
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And without deviation, the expected profit is, 
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When * 1
4
3
m λ< , which is always the case, 
( ) ( ' ) 0iX iXE Eπ π− > . Thus any deviation is not an optimal choice. 
 
Let ( ') 2 '( ' )L m m m m m m= − + − .  
It can be shown that 
3( ' )
'
L
m m
m
∂
= −
∂
,  
which is positive when m’>m, and negative when m’<m. In the first case, it means m’ should be 
decreased so as to reduce the positive gap between expected profit at m and expected profit at m’; 
in the latter case, it means m’ should be increased so as to reduce the positive gap between 
expected profit at m and expected profit at m’. Thus there is incentive to converge to m. 
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Appendix B 
 
Wages in the labor market 
Wages offered by the firm should be at least as high as the certainty equivalent income of the 
expected net revenue of the typical producers of m and x under market organized production and 
exchange.  
Assume that an individual spends all his income in consuming the product X .  
Step 1: from ( )U x  to ( )U π - a transformation, 
0( ) ( ) ( )A
X
m
X
U x Q P U
P
π π β π= × = × =  
Step 2: finding certainty equivalent income. 
As the utility of π  is a linear function. It implies that the certainty equivalent income is ( )E π  itself. 
Thus at equilibrium, wage is set at ( ) ( )X Mw E Eπ π= = . 
 
Appendix C 
 
Entrepreneurship and firm-dominated market 
Assume that the information processing ability distributes randomly over the industrial population, 
which we put into an ordered sequence 1 2 3( , , ,..., )nθ θ θ θΘ = .  
Instead of quoting 0β  and expected income – the latter as wage w  provided by the firm – both 
from the market-organized production, when enough portion of the industrial population becomes 
entrepreneurial and firm production dominates the industry, we assume w  and 0β  to be 
exogenously given.  
Therefore the optimal size of the firm is, with 
1
2
α = ,  
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* 1 0 1
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Let’s assume that the firm operation requires * 1i ≥ . The θ  which satisfies such condition is 
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It means that only those θ s which are smaller than this threshold can enable a firm to survive. 
A surviving firm’s maximized profit therefore is 
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To enable the existence of the whole industry, the pair of w  and 0β  should deliver any firm a profit 
greater than or equal to zero. It can be inferred from the equation that w  and 0β  decide whether 
or not there is positive profit, while θ  works to zoom in or out the positive profit. Perfect 
competition among a large number of firms would drive 0β  up so that eventually 
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, 
which makes  *( ) 0fE π = . 
Only when there is a few number of θ s that satisfy * 1i ≥ , there would be market power to the 
small number of firms. And they have 
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Which makes *( ) 0fE π > . 
In the former case, all firms are making zero profit; in the latter case, the firm with the least 
information processing ability (or with the largest θ ) makes the smallest positive profit. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Table I 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Regressand:     
Resid_gtfp Yes  Yes  
gtfp  Yes  Yes 
Regressors:     
gitph 0.09** 0.10** 0.12** 0.12** 
gitph(-1) - - -0.06 -0.03 
gilcph 0.40** 0.40** 0.38** 0.39** 
fz -1.64 9.14** -0.78 9.62** 
C -0.02 -0.11** -0.03 -0.11** 
Fixed country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period None None None None 
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.39 0.50 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.88 2.16 1.88 2.18 
* 10% significant; ** 5% significant. 
 
Table II 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Method of Estimation GLS OLS OLS GLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 65 65 65 64 64 228 228 228 
Regressand:         
Resid_gtfp Yes   Yes Yes    
gtfp  Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Regressors:         
gitph 0.14* -0.03 -0.01 0.15* 0.07 -0.06* -0.07* -0.08* 
gitph(-1) - - - -0.12 -0.05 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
gilcph -0.20 0.22* 0.16 -0.22 -0.02 0.26** 0.28** 0.29** 
fz -2.51** -1.43 -0.29 -1.96 -0.34 - - - 
C 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Fixed country Yes Yes None Yes None Yes None Yes 
Fixed period None None Yes None Yes None Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.37 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.24 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.39 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.88 0.00 0.06 0.01 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.65 2.40 1.89 2.66 2.44 1.73 1.57 1.72 
* 10% significant; ** 5% significant. 
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 Figure 8: Key variables of the Wholesale and retail industry.  
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Figure 10: Key variables of the finance and insurance industry 
